

## **The Nature of Authoritative Evidence in Polybius and Agelaus' Speech at Naupactus\***

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From several perspectives, the Aetolian ambassador Agelaus' speech at Naupactus is a key passage in Polybius' *Histories* (5.104.1–11). It contains what is perhaps the most memorable image in the work, the metaphor of the ultimate victor in the Hannibalic War as clouds from the west looming over Greece (5.104.10), and it signals the initiation of the *symplokê*, the historical point at which, in Polybius' eyes, the affairs of east and west became inextricably intertwined (5.105.4–10). Henceforth, Polybius judged, there were no longer discrete historical theaters; the only worthwhile history would therefore be synoptic and universal in scope.<sup>1</sup> Most modern scholars agree that Polybius has amplified the historical importance of the Naupactus conference as a marker for the unification of the *oikoumenê*. Moreover, Agelaus' speech furthers Polybius' representation of Philip V of Macedonia as an aggressor with unlimited imperialistic schemes, as Agelaus, like Demetrius of Pharos before him, appeals to Philip's ambitions for world sovereignty in his plea for peace at Naupactus.

This paper addresses these two ideas in Agelaus' speech, the *symplokê* and Philip's aggressive character, in order to understand what constitutes authoritative evidence in Polybius, and, more generally, to gain insights into the nature of Polybian historiography. It argues that:

1. while Polybius has tailored Agelaus' speech to fit his conception of the *symplokê*, he is consistent here with his stated principles concerning recorded speeches and historiographical truth;
2. although we may accept the historicity of some of the specific contents of Agelaus' speech, historical data do not support the idea that Philip's

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. 1.3.3–6, following the reading of Moore, and 4.28.5. On the *symplokê*, Walbank 1985: 313–24. All dates are B.C.E. Unless otherwise noted, all references are to Polybius. I have used Büttner-Wobst's Teubner edition.

ambitions for western imperialistic schemes leading to universal dominion lay behind his peace initiative at Naupactus;

3. the historian's authority in Polybius' methodological conception allows for the application of universal categories to inform particular cases. Here Polybius' general ideas on the malleability of youth, the Macedonian state, and monarchies may have provided templates for his representation of Philip's motivations at Naupactus.

### **The *Symplokê* and Agelaus' Speech**

Much of the modern controversy over Polybius' rendering of Agelaus' speech revolves around the question of the speech's historicity. Deininger (1973) maintains that Agelaus' admirable sentiments on Hellenic unity run counter to Polybius' generally negative portrayal of Aetolians and that therefore the speech must be historical. His view of Agelaus' speech is in line with the modern *communis opinio*, which generally accepts the historicity of Polybian speeches.<sup>2</sup> Mørkholm, on the other hand, argues that historical considerations demonstrate that the speech is a Polybian fabrication. Employing Holleaux's famous thesis, he maintains that neither Rome nor Carthage had any interests in Greece at this time. Therefore, Agelaus' appeal to Hellenic unity in the interests of common security and his warning of the threat from the western powers are anachronistic, and the speech is a Polybian fiction that advances the historian's interpretation of this point in time as the beginning of the *symplokê*. Mørkholm believes that modern scholars have failed to see the historical impossibility of Agelaus' anachronistic ideas because they have taken Polybius' historiographical statements concerning speeches at face value. According to him, they have erroneously assumed that the speeches are authentic or at least that Polybius believed them to be so.<sup>3</sup>

Basing their debate on modern, not ancient, historiographical standards and assumptions, these scholars have offered a simple choice: either the speech is historical or it is not. This approach has caused Polybian scholars considerable difficulty.<sup>4</sup> Viewed from the perspectives of the function of the speech in classical historiography in general and Polybius' historiographical pronouncements on speeches and the historian's prerogatives in particular,

<sup>2</sup>For references, Deininger 1971: 27 n. 8; Gruen 324 n. 34; Mørkholm 1967: 240 n. 2.

<sup>3</sup>Mørkholm 1967; id. 1974 (I here paraphrase Mørkholm's statement on p. 132). By "authentic," I take Mørkholm to mean that these speeches were based on some sort of documentary evidence, as in the case of Tac. *Ann.* 11.24 and the Lyons tablet (*CIL* 13.1668).

<sup>4</sup>Cf. Pédech 263–64 and 275–76; Walbank 1985: 248–49; id. 1957: 453 (*ad* 4.5.7); Mørkholm 1974: 130 and nn. 15–16.

however, some of the seemingly intractable problems in Agelaus' speech admit of a resolution.

A key passage for Polybius' practice in recording speeches is 12.25i.3–9. There Polybius demands that the historian record the words spoken, according to the truth, τοὺς κατ' ἀλήθειαν ῥηθέντας λόγους (12.25i.8). Elsewhere he states that the historian must eschew the practices of the tragic poets and record what really happened and what was truly said. Again the historian's duty is to report the words spoken, according to the truth, κατ' ἀλήθειαν (2.56.10–11; cf. 3.20.1–6; 12.25a–b, i8; 36.1.2–7). Yet in the passage from Book 12 Polybius also states that the historian must pick out the most suitable arguments for his historical agents' speeches, τοὺς ἀρμόζοντας καὶ καιρίους [λόγους] (12.25i.5). Gomme (522–23) takes this to mean that the historian picks out the best arguments for the historical situation at hand from all possible arguments that he himself might invent. This interpretation, though, seems to contradict the statements on the historian's duty to report the words spoken, according to the truth; and indeed, Polybius censures Timaeus for free invention in his speeches (12.25b.1–4; cf. 12.25i.5–6, with Sacks 88 n. 139). Walbank's attempt to resolve the difficulties raised by this passage (12.25i.3–8) resorts to an oscillation between historian as subject and statesman as subject. According to this reading, the statesman, selectively reasoning from practical experience, may choose among possible arguments best suited to his audience and his political circumstances. Much of the passage on Walbank's interpretation concerns the statesman, but we must understand an unsignalled shift to the historian in parts of sections 6–8. This reading is tortuously convoluted and has not won acceptance.<sup>5</sup>

Any consideration of Polybius' historiographical practices concerning speeches must come to terms with 36.1.1–4, where the historian admits to having recorded possible speeches, τοὺς ἐνόντας λόγους.<sup>6</sup> Sacks (87–89) has provided a satisfactory interpretation that accommodates 36.1.1–4: Polybius demands that the historian select the most historically significant parts of

<sup>5</sup>Walbank 1963: 211–13; id. 1967: 397 (*ad* 12.25i.4–9). Sacks 82–85 refutes Walbank; see Sacks 82 n. 131 for other adherents of this reading, and 84 n. 132 for Walbank's abandonment of it.

<sup>6</sup>Paton 355 translates this important passage as follows: "Perhaps some may ask themselves why I do not, now that I have to deal with a subject of such importance and so momentous an event, display my talent and report the particular speeches after the fashion of most authors who lay before us all that it is possible to say on either side. That I do not disapprove of such a practice is evident from various passages of this work in which I have quoted both the speeches [δημηγορίας] and the writings [συντάξεις] of politicians, but it will now be made clear that it is not my principle to do this on any and every pretext."

speeches actually spoken by his historical agents. But we can go further: τοὺς ἐνόντας λόγους, “possible speeches,” may well refer to orally transmitted, and more rarely transcribed, variants of particular speeches. The historian’s task, in this case, would be to select the version closest to historical truth and the words actually spoken, τοὺς κατ’ ἀλήθειαν ῥηθέντας λόγους. And there are no *a priori* grounds on which relatively uncommon written transcripts of speeches should have been more authoritative than oral traditions.

The working conditions of the ancient historian in fact point in the opposite direction. In most cases, the historian simply could not draw upon written transcripts of speeches. Under the rubric of historical speeches, Polybius distinguishes among battle exhortations, παρακλήσεις, deliberative speeches, δημηγορίαι, and ambassadors’ speeches, πρεσβευτικοὶ λόγοι (12.25a.3, 12.25i.3; cf. D.S. 20.1.2). The very possibility of protreptic, last-minute exhortations of field commanders to their troops before battle engagements is doubtful.<sup>7</sup> In any event, it is unlikely that written transcripts of such exhortations were available to the historian. The existence of Demosthenes’ δημηγορίαι may be due to his earlier career as λογογράφος and teacher of rhetoric (Adams 8 and n. 1, 10–11). This same consideration holds for the forensic speeches in the *corpus Lysiacum* that treat of matters proper to the Athenian deliberative assemblies (e.g., 12, 22, 25). Moreover, Lysias’ metic status at Athens severely restricted his rights of public address in the political arena and may well have encouraged speech-writing as an outlet for rhetorical expression. Plato provides some evidence for the practice of statesmen writing up public orations (*Phdr.* 257c5–258d11), but here we are also given a reason for politicians’ reluctance to publish speeches (257d4–8). This passage, at any rate, is irrelevant to the crucial point in this discussion: while some Greek symbouleutic speeches survive, as well as fragments and titles, the published speeches, after revisions and compression, would bear little resemblance to the actual words spoken.<sup>8</sup> Polybius sets deliberative speeches apart from writings of historical agents, and δημηγορίαι may well denote oral transmission, whereas συντάξεις are writings (36.1.2–4; cf. Sacks 89 n. 141). Some titles and fragments of πρεσβευτικοὶ λόγοι, mostly from Antiphon and Hyperides, survive (Hansen 163 n. 22). As concerns ambassadors’ speeches in Polybius, the speech of the Rhodian envoy Astymedes before the Roman Senate in spring 167 is instructive. Polybius feels it necessary to point out that he found the

<sup>7</sup>Hansen; Clark and Ehrhardt are more optimistic. For Polybian battle exhortations, Ziegler 1526; cf. Hansen 167 n. 43.

<sup>8</sup>See Adams 20–22 on the probable circumstances of publication of *Philippics* 3 and 4. Hansen 163 nn. 19–20 assembles the ancient references.

speech in written form, which suggests that for him συντάξεις, written transcripts, were but one source for historical agents' speeches, and perhaps an unusual one.<sup>9</sup>

Polybius lived and wrote in a semi-oral, predominantly non-literate society. Greek historiographical source theory, as far as we can reconstruct it, did not value written documents highly. Books ranked behind travel, autopsy, interrogation of eyewitnesses, and personal political experience, and this attitude informed a Greek tendency, from Thucydides onward, for serious history to be orally derived, contemporary history.<sup>10</sup> Yet modern investigations of both the editorial practices of contemporary oral historians and the distortions of eyewitness accounts do not inspire confidence in the superiority of this type of historiography (Henige 67, 107, 110–12, and literature cited there). Second-hand impressions, various social pressures, and the power of well-established community memory all may override first-hand experience and vitiate eyewitness accounts (Thompson 136–49, 239–40), while studies on memory show that recollections of recent events are most untrustworthy (ibid. 110–13, 116, 123–24). Here recent work in socio-cognitive psychology suggests that human information processing may impede accurate recall from the outset: people employ not only data but also preconceived schemata in acquiring new information, with the data/schemata ratio varying according to situational factors and accountability (Leyens, Yzerbyt, and Schadron 82–86, 128–50). As Fussell (247) observes about participants' reconstructions of the First World War, "One notices and remembers what one has been 'coded'—usually by literature or its popular equivalent—to notice and remember." In any event, Polybius clearly believed that contemporary or near-contemporary history was the only history worth writing, and we must postulate not only that he painstakingly searched out the substance of his historical agents' speeches but also that material for their reconstruction was most often orally transmitted. Since Timaeus relied primarily on written documents and did not have personal experience in travel, politics, and war, he wrote without authority.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>9</sup>30.4.11–12, against Pédech 275–76. For a list of second century Roman speeches available to Livy, see Luce 183 n. 104. Interestingly, however, Livy declined to reproduce Cato's *pro Rhodiensibus*, as a written transcript was extant in the *Origines* (Liv. 45.25.2–4).

<sup>10</sup>4.2.2–4; 12.25i.2–3. Schepens 1975a; see also id. 1975b: 187–88; Woodman 15 and n. 83. Cf. Thompson 27–32, 41–46, 56–67 for the historiographical importance of oral testimony in the modern period.

<sup>11</sup>12.25g.1–25i.3, with Sacks 86–87; cf. 12.4c.2–4d.8, 25d.1–2, 25e.7. But Timaeus himself appealed to similar criteria of historical credibility: D.H. 1.67.4: πυθέσθαι δὲ αὐτὸς ταῦτα παρὰ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων (on the Trojan origins of Rome); cf. 12.9.1–11.4.

The working conditions of the ancient historian, then, and the preference for autopsy, personal experience, and oral testimony acquired through the cross-examination of eyewitnesses over written documents, preclude any extensive use by historians of written transcripts of speeches. Moreover, Polybius' demands for accuracy in reporting historical agents' speeches are often embedded in polemics against other historians. These programmatic statements rely on Polybius' practical experience, which includes questioning informants, in order to establish the historian's authority and credibility.<sup>12</sup>

Of course, complete information acquired through autopsy, interrogation, and personal experience cannot be an actuality. Broad experience in political and military affairs, however, allows the historian to extrapolate from the known to the unknown (cf. 2.35.5–10; 12.25b.3–4, 25i.6–7; Petzold 67–68). Historical understanding gained through experience lay at the heart of notions of complete information in Greek historiographical source theory.<sup>13</sup> While the terms of the historiographical debate in Book 12 may have been set by the Peripatetic theoreticians, Polybius shifts the focus from matters of style to the historian's pragmatic activity and experience as the proper criteria for excellent history writing.<sup>14</sup> His own authority rests on ἐμπειρία, αὐτοπάθεια, and ἔμφασις. The perspicacity of Polybius' ideal historian allows for the recasting or reconstruction of speeches in order to elucidate the historically important forces and issues that lie behind them, and this explains why in Polybius events are overdetermined by λόγοι: proposals frequently materialize exactly as stated.<sup>15</sup> And Polybius' practice in recording speeches is a selective operation, as is made clear when he explicitly states that he intends to record only the most important parts of speeches (36.1.7, τὰ καιριώτατα καὶ πραγματικώτατα).

For Polybius history concerns the outcome of events, their accompanying circumstances, and their causes (3.32.6–9). Likewise, the historical significance of speeches lies in the underlying reasons why what was said led to failure or success (12.25b.1–3). Polybius composes history according to large patterns that are beyond the ken of his historical agents, who may be of limited importance to these patterns. They may complete historical sequences that others set in motion, as in the case of Alexander's Persian expedition or

<sup>12</sup>E.g., 12.25g.1–4. See Vercruysse; Schepens 1990; Walbank 1985: 262–79; cf. Mørkholm 1974: 130 n. 14.

<sup>13</sup>Polybius admits the limitations of personal experience at 12.4c.4–5, 25h.6–25i.1; on ideas of complete information in Greek historiography, Schepens 1975c.

<sup>14</sup>12.25g.1–25i.4. On Peripatetic historiographical terminology, Schepens 1975b: 192–200; Gray; Walbank 1985: 224–41 is skeptical.

<sup>15</sup>E.g., 30.3.8–9, with Pédech 257–59. For discussion and further references, Sacks 91 n. 146.

Perseus' war against Rome. Only the universal historian is in a position to uncover these large patterns (Walbank 1994; cf. Pédech 507–8). In light of Polybius' view of the authority of the historian, the gap between τοὺς ἐνόντας λόγους and τὰ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ῥηθέντα begins to close. The historian in Polybius' historiographical conception is in a better position to understand a speech's "entire intention" than the historical agent who uttered it.<sup>16</sup>

The *symplokê* of world history is a defining pattern of Polybius' work. His universal history is a unified whole, σωματοειδῆ, largely because in his view the historical events that it recounts unified the *oikoumenê*.<sup>17</sup> The *symplokê* is announced at the opening of the *Histories* (1.3.4–5; cf. 1.4.11; 4.28.3–5; 5.31.4–5), but immediately following Agelaus' speech Polybius first mentions that the conference at Naupactus marked its precise beginning (5.105.4–10). Indeed, Agelaus provides a metaphorical cue to this event as the initiation of the *symplokê* (5.104.1, συμπλέκοντες). In closing, the Aetolian ambassador reinforces the idea of the *symplokê* when he observes that wars and disputes among the Greek communities are soon to become parochial trivialities on the stage of world history: τὰς παιδιὰς, ἃς νῦν παίζομεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους (5.104.10).

Polybius' claims for the significance of the Naupactus conference rest on shaky historical foundations: despite what he says, there is no evidence for eastern Greek appeals to Rome, let alone Carthage, at this time or soon thereafter (5.105.6–7).<sup>18</sup> Pédech (507) meets such objections by arguing that for Polybius, what counted was a change in the minds of Greek statesmen at this time, not any fundamental change in international politics after the conference. In light of the editorial authority of the historian in the Polybian conception of historiography, we may reformulate Pédech's statement: what counts is that this conference marked a change in world history in the mind of the historian. Polybius selected and embellished a tradition about Agelaus' speech that advanced his own theory of the *symplokê*, and I have argued that such an enhancement would be well within the bounds of his historiographical principles. The following section considers the historicity of specific elements in Agelaus' speech in order to evaluate Polybius' account of Philip's motivations for desiring peace at Naupactus, which I treat in the final section.

<sup>16</sup>Badian 1992: 189 renders τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης at Th. 1.22.1 as "entire intention." For examples of Polybius relaying a speech's "entire intention," see 30.4.9–10 and 35.2.15, with Sacks 91 and n. 145.

<sup>17</sup>1.3.4–5, with Walbank 1957: 43–44; id. 1972: 67–68; cf. 3.32.2–4; 14.12.5.

<sup>18</sup>Walbank 1957: 629–30 (*ad* 5.105.4–10); id. 1972: 68–71; id. 1985: 313–24. The time span for this passage is vague. One might generously assume that Polybius here refers to the Aetolian embassies in Rome that led to the so-called Treaty of Laevinus, several years after the Naupactus conference.

### Historical Considerations

In Polybius' account, Philip V, while attending the Nemean Games in July 217, received secret information of the Roman defeat in the battle at Lake Trasimene. He communicated this news only to his courtier, Demetrius of Phoros, upon whom he enjoined silence (5.101.7–8; cf. 102.2). Demetrius advised an immediate termination of the war against the Aetolians and proposed plans to seize Illyria in preparation for an invasion of Italy (5.101.8–9; cf. Welwei 41 and nn. 127–28). Philip immediately sent Cleonicus of Naupactus, an Aetolian prisoner of war, to the Aetolians to relay a peace initiative (5.102.4–5). After several interchanges, having called representatives to a general peace conference, Philip crossed to Panormus, the harbor opposite Naupactus (5.102.4–10). The Macedonian king desired to conceal his real motivation for the peace initiative, which was to have a free hand for operations in the west. Yet Agelaus' speech at the conference echoes Demetrius' advice and Philip's secret plans for western imperialistic schemes (5.101.10, 104.7–9, 105.1–2).

The historicity of the Aetolian ambassador's delivery of a speech at the Naupactus conference and his proposal for immediate peace are beyond question, and Mørkholm (1967: 252; cf. Gruen 324) concedes this much. Although archaeological evidence indicates weakening trading contacts between Greek Massilia and Carthage in the period between the First and Second Punic Wars, Massilia's proximity to Punic Spain and its maintenance of contacts with the Greek mainland, as evidenced by the Massiliote Treasury at Delphi, imply that it would have been a well-informed source for Greek statesmen on matters concerning the build-up of Carthaginian power in Spain. And in the First and Second Illyrian Wars, Rome made impressive displays of its power across the Adriatic.<sup>19</sup> There is reason to believe, therefore, that Greek politicians followed events in the west closely enough to proclaim to their followers that the outcome there would have a serious impact on the Greek states, and it is not historically implausible that Agelaus should make reference to current events in Italy and warn of the threat from the western powers.<sup>20</sup> As far as Agelaus' famous metaphor is concerned, the image of the clouds from the west may have been in large part what made the speech so memorable (5.103.8–

<sup>19</sup>Morel 479–92 on Mediterranean trade in the third century; App. *Ital.* 8; D.S. 14.93 for the Massiliote Treasury at Delphi. On the Roman demonstrations of power, see 2.11.1–8; 3.16.7, 18.1–19.8 with Hammond 1968: 6 n. 19; Badian 1964: 4–5, 17 and n. 74. Cf. Gruen 372 n. 69 for references to two consular armies operating against the Istrian pirates in 221 and again in 220.

<sup>20</sup>See Gruen 323–25, who sees, however, a rhetorical ploy, not a real Greek fear; cf. Deininger 1971: 27. Rhetorical *topoi* of panhellenic unity in the face of external threats and a preemptive strike go back at least to Isocrates' political pamphleteering.



9), and Agelaus' speech may be the source for this figure in the speech of Lyciscus (9.37.10) and in the narrative proper (38.16.3–4).

Agelaus' echoing of Demetrius' proposal for Macedonian campaigning in the west, which was inspired, in Polybius' account, by the secret news of Trasimene, is more problematic. A period of some two months elapsed between Trasimene and the peace conference.<sup>21</sup> The news of the Roman defeat would have been common knowledge among the Greek statesmen at Naupactus. It is possible that Demetrius relayed Philip's western plans to the Aetolian peace party, despite the Macedonian king's imperative of silence. The mercurial Demetrius routinely went his own way, and this debriefing and Agelaus' staged sentiments would have removed any hesitations concerning peace in Greece on the part of Philip, who recently had raided Elis, either in order to conceal his desire for peace (so Polybius), or because he was uncertain as to his future policy towards Aetolia.<sup>22</sup> By late summer 217, Aetolia was nearing a state of exhaustion as a result of Philip's sack of Thermum in the previous year and a series of military defeats and territorial losses (cf. 5.6.6–9.7, 13.1–14.11). Philip was in a superior bargaining position and both parties knew it. This is why the Aetolians would have been agreeable to terms *uti possidetis*, despite Aetolian knowledge of Philip's desire to free his hands for western operations (5.103.2–4).

While it is true that Macedonians venerated the warrior king and that both economics and prestige drove the ideology of conquest among the Hellenistic monarchs,<sup>23</sup> the extent of Philip's western aspirations in Polybius' account is unconvincing. Whatever Demetrius' suggestions may have been, the Macedonian king probably did not seriously entertain any ideas of sustained operations on the Italian peninsula. Philip's putative western schemes would have represented a turning away from the traditional foreign policy of Macedonia in Greece and the Aegean. Furthermore, in the event of Hannibal's defeat of Rome, it is difficult to see how any prolonged Macedonian presence in Italy could have led to anything other than a contest with Carthage for Italian supremacy. More important, as Dell (96–99) showed, is the fact that during this period the Macedonian monarchy had its hands full with stabilizing its Illyrian frontier, a situation hardly conducive to enterprises across the Adriatic. And

<sup>21</sup>For the chronology of Trasimene and the Naupactus conference, Walbank 1957: 412 (*ad* 3.78.6), 629 (*ad* 5.105.3); Mørkholm 1967: 243 n. 9; cf. Mørkholm 1974: 129 and n. 8.

<sup>22</sup>5.102.6–7. On Demetrius' character, Eckstein 1994. For the idea that Demetrius gave a hint of his plans to the Aetolians, Walbank 1972: 69 n. 11.

<sup>23</sup>Plut. *Demetr.* 44 records defections from Demetrius I Poliorcetes to Pyrrhus of Epirus based on the rank-and-file's belief that military brilliance establishes the right to rule. See Austin on the economics of warfare in the Hellenistic monarchies.

Demetrius, like Teuta before him, could provide no guarantees against independent marauding of the various Illyrian tribal groups.<sup>24</sup>

Nevertheless, Philip must have viewed Roman actions from the early 220s in Illyria as provocative and aggressive geopolitical acts. Philip II had set a precedent for Macedonian claims to Illyrian suzerainty (Isoc. *Phil.* 21), and Polybius' own text reflects further claims that Macedonia traditionally had served as a bulwark for Greece against barbarian incursions (9.35.3; 18.37.9). Dell (98–102) argued that Macedonia was incapable of controlling its Illyrian frontier after the fall of Epirus and that the Roman intervention in 229 provided welcome relief for Antigonos III Doson. Despite Dell's arguments, Roman involvement across the Adriatic could not have failed to underscore Macedonian weakness and sully Macedonia's international reputation. After the expedition against Teuta, Roman dependencies, at Issa to the north, at Corcyra to the south, and at Epidamnus and Apollonia and among the Parthini and Atintani on the mainland, ensured that Rome indirectly controlled the fertile Illyrian plain of the Myzeqija. Consequently, Dassaretis, the buffer state between Roman dependents and Macedonia created in the aftermath of the First Illyrian War, was drawn into the Roman political orbit, as its transhumant economy depended upon access to this plain of southern Illyria.<sup>25</sup> Yet these developments were inadvertent on Rome's part. Badian (1964; cf. Dell 95) has demonstrated both that the Romans had no well-defined Illyrian policy in the 220s and that the term "Illyrian protectorate" for the Roman measures following the First Illyrian War distorts the nature of Roman influence across the Adriatic at this time. This certainly was a much looser arrangement than the provincial scheme employed in Sicily and Sardinia-Corsica two years later. But the emphasis here is on Macedonian perceptions, a far different matter. Furthermore, Macedonia suffered a diplomatic snub in 228 when Rome elected to send embassies announcing its victory over the Ardiaean queen-regent to the Aetolian and Achaean Confederations, traditional Macedonian enemies, as well as to Corinth and Athens, states hostile to Macedonia (2.12.4–8). From the end of the First Illyrian War, the Macedonian perception must have been that Rome had encroached on a historical Macedonian theater of action, and Philip's western aspirations most likely did not go beyond eliminating the Roman presence in Illyria.

<sup>24</sup>2.8.8–9; Dell 97–98, 101. Cf. the independent raiding of the Illyrian Vardaei and Palariioi in 135: App. *Ill.* 10; Liv. *Per.* 56.

<sup>25</sup>Hammond 1968: 1–9; Wilkes 13–25, esp. 15–17.

Several acts in Philip's career point in this direction. In recounting the hasty retreat of the one hundred Macedonian λέμβοι from the Illyrian coast in 216, Polybius makes a remark that touches upon Philip's motivation: had the panic-stricken Philip not fled, he would have been master of Illyria (5.110.10). Philip's burning of his fleet two years later on the Aoüs river, following the fiasco at Apollonia, does not look like the action of one who was bent on extensive western operations (Liv. 24.40.17; Plut. *Arat.* 51, with Walbank 1940: 75–76). In 213 and in 212, Philip worked to gain possession of Illyrian strongholds (8.13.1–14.11), and at the Locris conferences in autumn 198, Flamininus demanded that Philip relinquish Illyrian territories seized since the Treaty of Phoenice (18.1.14; cf. Liv. 32.33.3–4).

Polybius' own text provides the most compelling evidence in support of the interpretation offered here. Philip's pact with Hannibal in 215 is indicative of his intentions some two years earlier at the Naupactus conference. In this defensive covenant, Macedonian interests lie in driving the Romans out of Corcyra, Apollonia, Epidamnus, Pharosos, Dimale, and the lands of the Parthini and Atintani.<sup>26</sup>

Polybius' account suggests much more than this. In addition to grander schemes, Demetrius proposes the realistic design of Macedonian recovery in Illyria in the wake of Trasimene (5.101.8–9), but this idea is not present in Agelaus' speech, where the Aetolian ambassador advises a Macedonian attempt at universal dominion (5.104.7–9), and it has dropped out of Polybius' account of the *symplokê* as well. Polybius underscores the aggressive imperialistic impulse for universal rule on Philip's part repeatedly: in Demetrius' initial proposal (5.101.10–102.1), in Agelaus' speech, and indirectly by designating this conference (and Philip's motivation for desiring peace in Greece) as the initiation of the *symplokê* (5.105.4–6). Indeed, as Davidson points out, Agelaus suggests that Philip, biding his time, play the role of the third competitor or ἐφεδρος in Italy, waiting in the wings to tackle the victor, whether it be Rome or Carthage (5.104.5–7).<sup>27</sup>

<sup>26</sup>7.9.13–14; cf. Zonar. 9.4; Derow 1991: 268 and n. 21. For some modern views on Philip's intentions, Welwei 42 n. 132. On the geographical position of the Parthini, Walbank 1957: 163 (*ad* 2.11.11); on that of the Atintani, Hammond 1967: 600, 633–34; id. 1968: 8 and n. 29.

<sup>27</sup>Davidson 15 and n. 24. Agelaus adopts a more cautious and restrained tone than the impetuous Demetrius, but the salient point here is that both Demetrius and Agelaus appeal to Philip V's boundless imperialistic ambitions.

### Universals and Particulars: Philip's Motivations at Naupactus

In addressing the question of Philip's conscious intentions in calling for peace at Naupactus, the preceding section is no more than a probable historical reconstruction, necessarily of a provisional and conjectural nature. Yet Polybius categorically and unambiguously states that Philip was moved by Demetrius' and Agelaus' suggestions concerning imperial conquest of the west and eventually of the entire world, which matched his own inclinations (5.102.1, 105.1–2; cf. 7.13.1–2). Agelaus encourages Philip to entertain hopes of competing for universal sovereignty, *σὺν καιρῷ τῆς τῶν ὅλων ἀντιποιήσασθαι δυναστείας* (5.104.7). This passage not only provides verbal echoes of Polybius' own comments and of Demetrius' earlier advice (5.101.10–102.1), which the Illyrian courtier continued to urge upon Philip until world conquest filled the king's dream world (5.108.5–6), but also strikes a discordant note with the tenor of Agelaus' speech as a whole, which is a defensive appeal to Hellenic unity in the face of a foreign threat.

Even in the event that Philip had imperialistic designs on the Italian peninsula, Polybius' account begs the question as to how the historian confidently was able to recover the Macedonian monarch's true motivations. In this section I suggest a rationale, based upon Polybius' historiographic conceptions, that allowed for the unqualified assertion of Philip's psychological state at the Naupactus conference.

In addition to making direct statements concerning an individual's motives, as here in the case of Philip at Naupactus, Polybius may convey psychological states in a more oblique fashion. Through Polybius, as transparent medium as well as primary narrator, the reader may gain access to the thoughts and perceptions of historical characters, individually or collectively. These perceptions weave a complex web of perceptual relationships that may well be more important in Polybius' eyes than any objective, material historical reality.<sup>28</sup> The basis of validity for these varied types of inferred motivation or perception poses problems.

For Polybius the psychological well-springs of his characters' actions are the most important factor in offering historical explanations.<sup>29</sup> Individual psychology, however, is a tricky business, as is clear in the reflections on Aratus of Sicyon, a man of extreme contrasts and contradictions (4.7.11–8.9). External constraints and historical contingencies account for this complexity:

<sup>28</sup>See Davidson; cf. Connor on complex perceptual relationships in Thucydides' narrative discourse.

<sup>29</sup>11.19a.1–3; cf. 3.6.6–8; 12.25b.1–4; Derow 1994: 84–90; Eckstein 1989: 1–5.

they often force men to do and say things contrary to their true natures (9.22.10–23.5; cf. 8.8.8–9; 16.28.1–9; 33.17.1–5). The key to Polybius' recovery of perception, motivation or intention seems to lie here: the historian follows the lead of observable external factors back to interior psychological states. Polybius states that, unlike other writers, he does not give an assessment of historical characters before supplying an account of their deeds, from which inferred motivation proceeds.<sup>30</sup> Thus, the very success of Philip II's career indicates his kingly disposition and reveals the absurdity of Theopompus' negative evaluation of the characters of Philip and his companions, and Polybius objects to this historian's practice of providing character assessments of historical agents upon their introduction, prior to an exposition of their actions.<sup>31</sup>

The method appears to be inductive, a constellation of verifiable historical data leading to historically particular states of mind. Yet Polybius states that there are core individual natures after all, although external circumstances more often than not obscure them (9.23.4–5), and Pédech (216–29) has delineated two basic Polybian psychological types set up on a polarity of *logismos* vs. *thumos*. Moreover, once inside the mind of Polybius' historical characters, we find a more or less standard sequence of human mental processes, from initial affective perception to cognition to physical action (Pédech 242–43). An apparently inductive method, building upon historically contingent particulars, gives way to deduction from universal typologies.

In Polybius, ethnic identity provides numerous examples of universalizing categories informing or reinforcing particular instances. Generalized behavioral patterns, based on group stereotypes, may help to explain individual thought and behavior. Polybius' Aetolians, for example, are characterized by greed, impulse, and rapacity (Champion 316 n. 5, 323 n. 45). Dorimachus' irrational behavior was characteristic of an Aetolian, πλήρης Αἰτωλικῆς ὀρμῆς καὶ πλεονεξίας (4.3.5). Similarly, Theodotus' attempt on the life of Ptolemy IV Philopator before the battle at Raphia failed because of a typically Aetolian lack of foresight (5.81.1, Αἰτωλικῇ...τόλμῃ καὶ πράξει). Elsewhere Polybius writes of innate Phoenician characteristics and behavior (6.52.10; 9.11.2–3), and we learn that Hannibal adopted a ruse of disguise in his military camp that was typically Phoenician (3.78.1–4, Φοινικικῷ στρατηγῆματι). Cleomenes died bravely and like a Spartan, εὐψύχως πάνυ καὶ Λακωνικῶς (5.39.5; cf.

<sup>30</sup>10.26.9–10: ἀλλ' ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων αἰετὸν καθήκοντα λόγον ἀρμόζοντες ἀποφαινόμεθα; cf. 5.12.8; 8.8.7–8; Pédech 239; Petzold 19–20.

<sup>31</sup>9.1–11.2; cf. 10.21.8: τὸν ἀληθῆ...μετ' ἀποδείξεως καὶ τῶν ἐκάστοις παρεπομένων συλλογισμῶν. On Polybius' criticisms of Theopompus' depiction of Philip II, see Eckstein 1989: 3–4 and nn. 5–6.

2.69.8), while Golosses showed Numidian straightforwardness and simplicity in his approach to Hasdrubal, ἔχων Νομαδικῶ τινι τρόπῳ (38.7.4). As a final example, Bolis' Cretan origin accounts for his devious mental processes and behavior (8.16.4–7; cf. 19.5), and here the causal particle is noteworthy: ἅτε Κρής ὑπάρχων καὶ φύσει ποικίλος (8.16.4).

I suggest that similar universalizing categories may have given Polybius the key to Philip's psychological state at Naupactus. The Macedonian monarch's motivation for peace in Polybius' account maps well onto the historian's general ideas on youthful behavior, on the traditions of the Macedonian monarchy, and on kings. The young in Polybius are impulsive and intemperate. Hieronymus, king of Syracuse, epitomizes Polybius' irrational, greedy, and self-destructive young king. He gullibly accepted reports of Carthaginian successes and blindly rushed into an alliance with Hannibal. Soon he demanded Syracusan control of all Sicily in return for his support of Carthage. This mindless policy, and Hieronymus' haughty interview with Roman envoys, led to war with Rome—and ultimately to the Roman sack of the city and the end of Syracusan independence.<sup>32</sup> Hannibal's interchange with the Roman envoys at New Carthage constitutes another typical example of youthful folly in Polybius. In charging the Romans with injustices against pro-Carthaginian Saguntines, Hannibal lost control of his emotions and went beyond reason (3.15.9, καθόλου δ' ἦν πλήρης ἀλογίας καὶ θυμοῦ βιαίου). Polybius sums up Hannibal's career in Book 11, stating that his defeat was a result of miscalculation: had the young Hannibal begun by conquering the rest of the world, leaving the Romans for last, he could not have failed to achieve his ultimate purpose, the destruction of Roman power (11.19.6–7). At the beginning of the passage on the interview at New Carthage in Book 3, Polybius stresses Hannibal's youth: ἅτε νέος μὲν ὢν (3.15.6).<sup>33</sup>

Polybius censures Philip's attack on Thermum, in which a youthful lack of restraint played a causal role, διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν (5.12.5). He describes youth in several passages as being full of impulse, νέος...πλήρης δὲ πολεμικῆς ὁρμῆς (3.15.6, cf. 71.6; 4.3.5; cf. 15.25.31); thus Demetrius of Pharos, by means of his imperialistic schemes at Naupactus, incites Philip (παρώρμησε), who has sprung (ὀρμώμενον) from a royal house that always has coveted universal dominion (5.102.1). In a gnomic pronouncement Polybius states that young kings are at the mercy of their advisers (7.14.6; cf. 32.5.7–9), and in his account

<sup>32</sup>7.4.1–5.8. On these events, see Eckstein 1987: 135–55; on Polybius' portrayal of Hieronymus, see id. 1995: 143, 211.

<sup>33</sup>For discussion of these and further passages on youth in Polybius, see Eckstein 1995: 140–50 and literature cited there; cf. Pédech 237–38.

Demetrius' baneful influence is the decisive factor in Philip's steady deterioration (5.12.7–8; 7.11.1–14.6; 9.23.9). Subsequent historical events, according to Polybius, proved Philip's decision to become embroiled in western affairs a piece of ill-advised folly, a gross miscalculation founded on short-sighted greed and ambition. This decision led to Pydna and the obliteration of the Macedonian monarchy, and its impetus came from Demetrius and was reinforced by Agelaus (5.105.1–2). Philip's rash behavior at the conference adheres to Polybius' ideas on the naiveté and susceptibilities of young rulers, and Polybius emphasizes Philip's youth in his account of Naupactus: νέον βασιλέα (5.102.1).

Polybius' representation of Philip's behavior at Naupactus also conforms to the historian's thoughts on monarchic states in general and the Macedonian monarchy in particular. Monarchy, like all of the simple constitutional forms, is subject to the quasi-biological decay of states, or *anacyclosis*, which Polybius presents in his theoretical discussion of *politeiai* (6.3.5–9.14). While he employs the adverb βασιλικῶς in a positive sense (2.64.6; 5.12.1; 8.23.5) and praises true kingship (5.11.6; 6.4.2–3, 5.4–7.6), most of the kings treated in his work fall far short of the ideal and are well on the way in the deterioration from king to tyrant (Welwei 16–19, 123–86). Monarchs in Polybius measure hatreds and friendships by the criterion of expediency (2.47.5). If we accept the words of a Rhodian ambassador to the Roman Senate in 189 as representative of Polybius' own views, all monarchies strive for universal dominion (21.22.8–9). After having secured the loyalty of friends and allies, the historian states, kings begin to treat those who have trusted them as slaves (15.24.4–5; cf. 5.26.12–14; 22.7.8–8.13). His account of the course of Philip's career illustrates his conception of deteriorating kingship.<sup>34</sup> Polybius recounts Philip's lust for universal dominion (5.108.3–6; cf. 15.24.6), which is a characteristic feature of the Macedonian state throughout its history, from the Argeads to the Antigonids (5.102.1, with Walbank 1993), and, as we have seen, Philip eagerly accepts the imperialistic proposals of both Demetrius and Agelaus. Philip's impulsive, aggressive motivations at Naupactus are overdetermined by Polybius' universalizing conceptions on youth, the Macedonian state, and monarchy.

In discussing geometry and military science, Polybius stresses the importance of the ability to recognize analogy and likeness, ἀναλογίας ἔννοιαν ἔχειν καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰς ὁμοιότητος θεωρίας (9.20.1–2; cf. 12.25b.3–4). Elsewhere he contends that the scope of his universal history justifies his omission or compression of historical details as well as his stylistic

<sup>34</sup>Walbank 1985: 210–23; Welwei 38–53, 132, 153–55, 178–81, 185.

uniformity in recording speeches, where he may even use the same words as on previous occasions.<sup>35</sup> Here historical typologies and generalizations play a role, and I have suggested that Polybius used such general categories to uncover Philip's motivations. In Polybius' conception, only the universal historian, with credentials in practical affairs, may employ such general categories and historical typologies.

Polybius does not specify on what authority he has recovered Philip's mental processes at Naupactus, but he does do so in the similar case of Hannibal's state of mind in crossing the Alps. The historian bases his authority on his interrogation of eyewitnesses and his personal autopsy of the Alpine passes.<sup>36</sup> In other words, Polybius' credibility in reconstructing the mental states of his historical agents lies in his own vast experiences.

### Summation

Agelaus' speech advances Polybius' idea of the *symplokê* and furthers the historian's representation of Philip V of Macedonia as an aggressive imperialist. This image in turn conforms to several of Polybius' general conceptions. Neither the *symplokê* nor Polybius' reading of Philip's motivations at the Naupactus conference can satisfy any modern historiographical criteria for objective, historical fact. Yet relegation of Polybius to the liar school of historiography can only block an understanding of his working methods and a recognition of the broader insights into the nature of classical historiography that he provides. Agelaus' speech is a vehicle for Polybius' editorial voice, and it highlights two sweeping ideas in his historical vision, the unification of the *oikoumenê* and the crucial role that Philip played in that historical development. In Polybius' historiographic conception, judicious selections from available traditions on speeches and their responsible shaping constitute a legitimate means of emphasizing important historical issues. Polybius' ultimate authority for such operations derives from his wide travels, personal interrogations, and extensive knowledge of the arts of politics and war.

<sup>35</sup>29.12.6–7 and 9–12, with Walbank 1963: 211 and n. 35; id. 1985: 249 and n. 50; cf. Wooten 237–38, who finds in Polybian speeches evidence for the nature of Hellenistic oratory; Pédech 268–69, 276.

<sup>36</sup>3.48.12. On parallels between the Polybian depictions of Hannibal and Philip V, see Eckstein 1989: 10–12.



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